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Executive Summary
Each year foodborne diseases cause illness in approximately 1 in 6 Americans, resulting in 128,000 hospitalizations 
and 3,000 deaths. Decreasing resources impact the ability of public health officials to identify, respond to, and control 
foodborne disease outbreaks. The Foodborne Diseases Centers for Outbreak Response Enhancement (FoodCORE) 
program was established to address gaps in foodborne disease outbreak response by improving laboratory, 
epidemiologic, and environmental health capacity.    
FoodCORE addresses gaps in foodborne disease response through improved capacity to improve timeliness and 
completeness of outbreak response activities. FoodCORE promotes the evaluation and application of model practices 
to improve detection, investigation, and control of foodborne disease outbreaks. Successes are documented using 
performance metrics based on the Council for Improving Foodborne Outbreak Response Guidelines. FoodCORE centers 
regularly convene, provide quarterly reports, and collaborate with other foodborne diseases programs to discuss, 
document, and share model practices.
The FoodCORE centers during Year One (October 2010–September 2011) included: New York City, North Carolina, Ohio, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin. Centers improved completeness and timeliness for laboratory and 
epidemiologic activities. On average, over 95% of Salmonella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli, and Listeria (SSL) 
isolates were subtyped. Epidemiology staff followed up with nearly 90% of all reported SSL cases. FoodCORE centers 
routinely engage environmental health and/or regulatory partners, and are active participants in national outbreak 
surveillance. 
During Year One, FoodCORE centers improved timeliness and 
completeness of their foodborne disease outbreak response programs 
and used a newly developed set of performance metrics to document 
progress. Leveraging laboratory, epidemiology, and environmental 
health capacity, centers successfully applied model practices to build 
capacity for routine and surge capacity needs, making faster, more 
complete investigations possible. Enhanced outbreak response can 
identify sources of infection faster, limit additional illnesses, and help 
prevent future foodborne disease outbreaks. 
Introduction
Each year, foodborne diseases cause illness in 1 in 6 Americans resulting 
in 128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 deaths (1). If a larger number 
of people than expected appear to have the same illness in a given time period and area, it is a cluster. When an 
investigation shows that ill persons in a cluster have something in common to explain their illness, the group of illnesses 
is an outbreak (2). Approximately 1,000 outbreaks are reported annually through the National Outbreak Reporting 
System (3). In 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) investigated more than 200 multistate clusters 
and outbreaks. State and local public health officials investigated many more local or regional clusters and outbreaks. 
These investigations are important for solving outbreaks and preventing additional illnesses, and are critical to reducing 
the burden of foodborne disease. Fast and effective investigations are necessary to identify and remove contaminated 
food from the market to prevent additional illnesses, as well as to identify new routes of contamination and gaps in the 
food safety system to prevent similar outbreaks in the future. Many health departments need additional resources to 
conduct comprehensive foodborne disease surveillance as well as rapid and coordinated detection and investigation of 
foodborne disease outbreaks (4).
In 2009, to improve state and local responses to foodborne disease outbreaks, CDC funded a pilot program in three 
sites with support from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS) and the 
Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL). Following successes of the yearlong pilot, the FoodCORE (Foodborne 
Diseases Centers for Outbreak Response Enhancement) program was expanded in 2010. FoodCORE aims to improve 
state and local foodborne disease outbreak response and investigations by building capacity; developing collaborative 
surveillance and response programs; conducting rapid, coordinated, standardized investigations; and developing and 
implementing measurable performance indicators. 
This report describes the implementation and early successes of FoodCORE during the first year following the pilot. 
Colorized scanning electron micrograph (SEM) of clustered 
Gram-negative Salmonella Typhimurium bacteria.
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Methods
FoodCORE is a collaborative effort to build capacity across three areas to develop complete foodborne disease response 
programs: laboratory, epidemiology, and environmental health. Funded centers implement individual work plans specific 
to their public health structure to meet the FoodCORE goals of improving foodborne outbreak response activities.  
During October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2011 (Year One, Y1), seven centers participated in FoodCORE: New York City, 
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin. During Y1, centers implemented their work plans, 
developed and applied FoodCORE performance metrics, collaborated with other food safety programs, conducted 
trainings, and contributed to the development and testing of new tools and technologies. Enhancing capacity at 
the centers was supported through the CDC’s Epidemiology and Laboratory Capacity Grant; the average award was 
approximately $314,000 (range: $65,000–$512,000). 
In total, FoodCORE funding supported more than 40 positions in the centers, including over 15 student interviewer 
positions. For laboratory activities, five centers received funding to support staff, equipment, reagents, and software.  
Six centers provided a courier service to improve the completeness and timeliness of sample and specimen submissions  
to public health laboratories (PHL). Six centers began working towards the implementation of molecular serotyping. All 
seven centers received funding to expand epidemiologic capacity, including support for staff, equipment, and software. 
Four centers trained student interviewers to assist with epidemiologic interviewing and investigation; in one center, 
student positions also supported laboratory activities. For environmental health capacity, two centers received funding  
to support environmental health/food protection staff. 
Metrics are used to evaluate progress towards goals, identify gaps, and document successes. FoodCORE metrics, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/foodcore/ssl-metrics.html, are based on chapter 8 of the Council to Improve Foodborne 
Outbreak Response (CIFOR) Guidelines (5) and are reported separately by pathogen (6). Metrics data are reported for the 
burden, timeliness, and completeness of foodborne disease activities from outbreak surveillance and detection through 
investigation, response, control, and implementation of prevention measures (See Appendix A). Over time, metrics data 
quantitatively demonstrate changes in completeness and timeliness.  
Analyses on data collected during Y1 were conducted using SAS 9.3. Data were reported for the first two quarters 
combined (Q1 and Q2), the final quarter (Q4), and cumulative data for the entire Y1 period. To evaluate changes during  
the first year of the expanded program, data from Q1 and Q2 were used as a comparative baseline for Q4.  
Results
The results of Y1 activities include a description of the disease burden and structure of the centers, as well as summary 
metrics data for isolate-, case-, and cluster-based metrics (See Appendix A).
Disease burden and structure
FoodCORE centers have different population characteristics, disease burdens, and organizational structures (See Table 1). 
During Y1, centers covered a total population of approximately 47 million people, with a range from 2.8 to 11.5 million 
people, per center. Based on data for nationally notifiable diseases, the range of reported cases per center was <5 to  
45 cases of listeriosis; approximately 25 to over 200 cases of Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC); and 350 to  
over 2300 cases of salmonellosis (7). Centers cover both highly urbanized and rural populations. Five centers have  
a decentralized organization, meaning local health departments (LHDs), including county, city, rural, or regional 
departments, independently provide public health services (8). Two centers have a centralized structure, which provides  
all local public health services (8).    
The public health authorities responsible for conducting initial interviews with Salmonella, STEC, and Listeria (SSL) cases 
vary by center (See Table 1). In New York City, a team of student interviewers assists staff to complete interviews. In 
South Carolina, state staff located in regional offices conduct interviews. The five decentralized centers have different 
interviewing models. In North Carolina, LHD staff are responsible for interviewing SSL cases and centralized, state-based 
staff re-interview cases who are identified as part of a cluster or outbreak. In the other centers, LHD staff retain authority to 
interview SSL cases, but centralized staff are available to assist with interviews. In Wisconsin, LHDs can request assistance 
for any case(s); central staff also proactively contact LHDs who have not been able to complete an interview within seven 
days of report to offer interviewing assistance. In Ohio, Tennessee, and Utah, some LHDs have partnered with centralized 
staff so state-based interviewers automatically attempt interviews with all SSL cases in the LHD jurisdiction. Other LHDs 
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conduct their own routine interviews and utilize central staff for surge capacity, additional coverage, and for cases they 
might not be able to reach otherwise.  
Centers successfully implemented their work plans and used metrics to document improved laboratory, epidemiologic, 
and environmental health completeness and timeliness.
Isolate-based metrics
In Y1, the FoodCORE laboratories received over 9,000 SSL isolates and isolate-yielding specimens. This included SSL 
isolates (e.g., human, food, environmental) submitted to public health laboratories (PHLs) as well as isolates recovered 
from specimens submitted to PHLs. Primary isolates and isolate-yielding specimens are the subset of all received 
specimens limited to the first or representative SSL isolate or sample for each case or testing unit. The laboratories 
received a total of 8,264 Salmonella, 916 STEC, and 89 Listeria submissions; 7,677 (93%) of Salmonella, 787 (86%) of STEC, 
and 83 (93%) of Listeria were primary isolates. 
During baseline, the average proportion of Salmonella isolates with serotyping was 99% (range 95–100%) and for STEC 
it was 86% (range 46–100%). During Q4, these proportions improved to 100% (range 99–100%) for Salmonella and 
94% (range 76–100%) for STEC. The time it took to complete subtyping, or turn-around time (TAT), was measured in 
days, from receipt or recovery of an isolate to subtyping results. The median TAT for serotyping decreased as follows: for 
Salmonella, from 6 days (range 4–14 days) during baseline to 4 days (range 3–9 days) during Q4; for STEC, from 5 days 
(range 4–8 days) during baseline to 4.5 days (range 2–14 days) during Q4 (See Table 2).
The proportion of isolates with pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) subtyping, and the associated TAT, also improved 
during Y1. The average proportion of isolates with PFGE data increased as follows: for Salmonella from 82% (range 
28–100%) during baseline to 94% (range 56–100%) in Q4; for STEC, from 93% (range 67–100%) during baseline in to 98% 
(range 92–100%) in Q4; and for Listeria, from 82% (range 26–100%) during baseline to 100% for all centers in Q4 (See 
Figure 1). The median TAT for PFGE subtyping during baseline was 6 days (range 4-40 days) for Salmonella, 4 days (range 
3–8 days) for STEC, and 4 days (range 2–16 days) for Listeria. The median and range for TAT for Salmonella PFGE showed 
improvement in Q4 to 5 days (range 2–18 days). For STEC and Listeria, the median TAT remained the same at 4 days, but 
there was improvement in the range of TATs for PFGE: 2–9 days for STEC and 1–12 days for Listeria (See Table 2). 
Case-based and cluster-based metrics 
In Y1, epidemiology programs were notified of 7,951 SSL cases: 7,039 cases of Salmonella 
infection, 820 cases of STEC infection, and 92 cases of Listeria infection. FoodCORE resources 
supported additional staff for epidemiologic interview and investigation, resulting in an 
increased proportion of cases with an attempted interview from the baseline quarters 
through Q4. For Salmonella, the average proportion of cases with an attempted interview 
increased from 88% (range 53–100%) to 94% (range 78–100%). The average proportion 
of STEC cases with an attempted interview increased from 90% (range 60–100%) during 
baseline, to 97% (range 89–100%) in Q4. For Listeria, the average proportion of cases with  
an attempted interview remained at 100% during baseline and in Q4 (See Figure 2).
In addition to attempting an interview for the majority of reported cases, the timeliness of 
interviews also improved. The average TAT from notification to first attempted interview 
decreased as follows: for Salmonella from 1.3 days (range 0–3) during baseline to 0.6 days 
(range 0–2) in Q4; for STEC, from 2.7 days (range 1–5) to 0.6 days (range 0–1); and for Listeria, 
from 7 days (range 3–11) to 0.7 days (range 0–1) (See Table 2). 
Combining data from the laboratory and epidemiologic interviews and investigations, centers identified 510 clusters 
during Y1. Cluster investigations conducted within the centers were characterized by improved collaboration and 
communication across program areas. Centers participated in numerous multistate cluster investigations and provided 
critical contributions to investigative efforts. Centers conducted routine interviews among cluster-associated cases for 
472 (93%) of the identified clusters, including 100% of the STEC and Listeria clusters. Centers were able to determine a 
suspect vehicle associated with illness for 89 (17%) and a confirmed vehicle for 30 (7%) Salmonella clusters, 10 (18%) 
STEC clusters, and 3 (60%) Listeria clusters. Environmental health or regulatory partners were contacted in nearly half of 
all cluster investigations. The cluster investigations led to 78 public health actions including public messaging such as 
website updates or press releases, or regulatory actions. 
Electron micrograph of a Listeria 
bacterium in tissue. 
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Discussion
This report provides the first description of implementing the FoodCORE program. FoodCORE centers improved 
timeliness and completeness of their foodborne disease outbreak response programs and used a newly developed set of 
performance metrics to document progress. 
During Y1, centers successfully implemented their individual work plans to build capacity in the three areas: laboratory, 
epidemiology, and environmental health. Metrics are an essential tool for FoodCORE in evaluating the impact and 
effectiveness of activities, documenting successes, identifying gaps, and quantifying the scope of work and resources 
necessary to have a complete foodborne disease response program. 
Improving laboratory capacity
With FoodCORE funding the laboratories were able to increase and maintain the proportion of isolates subtyped by 
serotyping and PFGE while improving TAT to complete subtyping. The substantial progress made with the proportion of 
isolates with subtyping data is most evident by comparing the low end of the ranges between the baseline quarters and 
Q4 (See Figure 1). For example, in Q4 each center serotyped between 76-100% of all STEC isolates, an increase from the 
lowest value of 46% serotyped during the baseline quarters. For Salmonella, the lowest proportion of isolates with PFGE 
data improved from only 28% during baseline to 56% in Q4. The lowest proportion of isolates with PFGE data for STEC 
improved from 67% during baseline to over 90% in Q4. For Listeria, the proportion of isolates with PFGE data improved 
dramatically from a low of only 26% during baseline to 100% for every center during Q4. 
There were also improvements in the median TAT for serotyping and PFGE from baseline to Q4. For Salmonella, the median 
TAT for serotyping was reduced from 6 days to 4 days. The median TAT for Salmonella PFGE subtyping was also reduced by 
one day, but even more notable was the reduction in the top end of the range from 40 to 18 days. The median TAT for STEC 
serotyping was reduced by 0.5 days. The longest reported TAT for Listeria decreased from 16 to 12 days. 
Increased serotyping and PFGE subtyping are vital components to complete laboratory surveillance and outbreak 
detection. Complete and timely subtyping allows for more rapid detection of clusters and outbreaks. Early detection 
creates the opportunity to respond to and control outbreaks during an earlier stage, thereby limiting additional illness. 
Additionally, sampling and subtyping of food and environmental specimens can help determine the source of an outbreak 
and contributing factors, both of which are critical to response and control activities and informing prevention efforts.
Improving epidemiology capacity
The increase in the proportion of cases with an attempted interview quantifies the improved completeness of 
epidemiologic investigations within the centers. These improvements are most evident by comparing the low end of the 
ranges between the baseline quarters and Q4 (See Figure 2). 
The lowest proportion of cases with an attempted interview improved as follows: for Salmonella, from 53% during 
baseline to 78% in Q4; for STEC, from 60% during baseline to nearly 90% in Q4. For Listeria, the proportion of cases with 
an attempted interview was maintained at 100% for all centers. Not only were centers attempting to interview a high 
proportion of reported cases, these interviews were happening more quickly. The median TAT for attempted SSL interviews 
decreased to one day, or less. 
Improving the proportion of cases with an interview provides more 
complete epidemiologic data for routine surveillance as well as cluster 
and outbreak investigations. Case interviews provide crucial data for 
developing hypotheses about the vehicle of infection. Conducting 
interviews rapidly is critical in obtaining the most useful information 
from cases about their food consumption histories and other exposures. 
Reducing TAT from notification of a case to attempted interview helps 
ensure the best possible response and recall from cases. Routine case 
interviews can also identify high-risk cases who could spread their 
infections to others (e.g., food handlers, day care workers or attendees, 
healthcare workers). During interviews, cases can receive information 
about risky exposures and how to protect themselves and others. 
Colorized scanning electron micrograph of Gram-negative 
Escherichia coli bacteria O157:H7. 
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Improving cross-cutting activities
Leveraging laboratory, epidemiology, and environmental health capacity, the centers have successfully used FoodCORE 
resources in various outbreak investigations and to strengthen routine foodborne activities. FoodCORE centers have 
built capacity for routine and surge capacity needs, making faster, more complete investigations possible. Among the 
510 clusters identified during Y1, some clusters consisted of only two or three cases. Even including these small clusters, 
centers were still able to identify a suspect vehicle for almost 20% of these investigations, and a confirmed vehicle for 
nearly 10%. Identifying suspect and confirmed vehicles associated with illness helps mitigate ongoing outbreaks and 
informs prevention and education efforts to prevent similar outbreaks from recurring. 
Using FoodCORE resources, the centers have solved and controlled outbreaks that would not have been otherwise, and 
the availability of data and records has resulted in more rapid recall actions. 
Improving partnerships and collaborations
Centers conducted local and regional trainings for laboratory, epidemiologic, and environmental health investigations, 
building partnerships and improving communication across programmatic areas. These trainings further engage partners 
from local level public health officials to student interviewers, and contribute to the development of the public health 
workforce. The centers with student teams have developed training and evaluation tools for use with establishing and 
maintaining highly effective and well-trained student interviewers. 
Many of the centers collaborate with universities and academia as part of their work plans. Additionally, FoodCORE works 
closely with other federal and state programs, including PulseNet, Environmental Health Specialists Network, FoodNet, 
CaliciNet, NoroSTAT, and the Integrated Food Safety Centers of Excellence, which are centrally coordinated by CDC. 
FoodCORE also works with APHL, USDA-FSIS, CIFOR, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Rapid Response Teams.
The centers are contributing to the development and testing of new tools and technologies, centers pilot tested data 
sharing and visualization platforms with CDC and continue to develop and hone methods for cluster detection, data 
management, and routine data analyses and submission procedures.  
Limitations
This report is subject to at least two main limitations. Only one year of metrics data were available. The performance 
metrics were developed during the pilot project and finalized and implemented during Y1; therefore, there are no 
consistent pre-program data from all the centers. Data were not reported separately for all four quarters of Y1. These 
factors limited analyses of trends, but additional analyses will become feasible in the future with continued reporting. 
Conclusions
During Y1, FoodCORE centers improved timeliness and completeness of their foodborne disease outbreak response 
programs and used a newly developed set of performance metrics to document progress. FoodCORE is establishing model 
practices for the detection, investigation, response, and control of foodborne diseases. FoodCORE works collaboratively to 
identify and implement public health practices that can help shorten the time it takes to identify a source of infection and 
pinpoint how and why contamination occurred, in order to limit additional illnesses and help prevent future outbreaks.
The FoodCORE metrics are a critical component of the program, as they are useful for individual centers and overall 
programmatic evaluation. FoodCORE is developing performance metrics beyond the SSL metrics that have been 
implemented, including metrics for activities for norovirus as well as other and unknown etiologies.
Additional time and resources are needed to hone and test the model practices that are being developed and 
implemented by the centers. Initial start-up time and costs to build sufficient capacity for laboratory, epidemiology,  
and environmental health programs are critical. Continued resources and support are essential to maintaining the 
progress made during Y1 of activities. 
Expanded implementation of FoodCORE model practices and metrics would allow other localities to build capacity using 
methodologies that have been shown to be effective. Applying the lessons learned by centers across multiple jurisdictions 
would further enhance the evaluation and effectiveness of foodborne disease outbreak response and prevention. 
Leveraging laboratory, epidemiology, and environmental health capacity, centers successfully applied model practices to 
build capacity for routine and surge capacity needs, making faster, more complete investigations possible. 
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Table 1.  FoodCORE Center organizational structure, disease burden, and center-specific work plan details, Y1.  
Center Structure
2010 
Reported 
SSL1 cases2
Year 
joined 
FoodCORE
LAB EPI
Environmental 
Health (EH)
Implementing 
Molecular 
serotyping
Courier 
Service
Centralized 
Interviewing  
for SSL cases
Initial Interview 
Responsibility
New 
York 
City
Centralized
1309 Salmonella
79 STEC
45 Listeria
2009 Yes Yes
Student 
Team
Centralized 
interviewing for 
SSL
Collaborations 
with EHS-Net4 
and NYC Office 
of Environmental 
Investigations
North 
Carolina
Decentralized
2345 Salmonella
97 STEC
22 Listeria
2010 Yes Yes No
LHDs3 interview 
for SSL; Centralized 
follow-up 
interviews for 
cluster-associated 
cases
Collaboration 
with FDA Rapid 
Response Team 
(RRT)
Ohio Decentralized
1311 Salmonella
137 STEC
29 Listeria
2010 Yes Yes No
LHDs interview for 
SSL; Some LHDs 
participate in 
routine centralized 
interviewing for 
their SSL cases
Collaborations 
with Department 
of Agriculture 
and LHD 
Sanitarians and 
EH Specialists
 South 
Carolina
Centralized
1715 Salmonella
24 STEC
13 Listeria
2010 No Yes
Regional 
Staff
Regional 
interviewers (state 
staff ) interview 
SSL in 4 regions,  
coverage of all 
state regions as 
seasonal burden 
allows
Foodborne 
epidemiologists 
in Division of 
Acute Disease 
Epi and EH; Work 
closely together; 
EH staff directly 
supported
Tennessee Decentralized
1100 Salmonella
120 STEC
14 Listeria
2010 Yes Yes
Student 
Team
 
LHDs interview 
SSL cases with 
centralized 
assistance; Some 
LHDs participate in 
routine centralized 
interviewing for 
SSL cases
Collaborations 
with EHS-Net and 
General and EH 
Section
Utah Decentralized
350 Salmonella
94 STEC
3 Listeria
2009 Yes Yes
Student 
Team
LHDs interview 
SSL cases with 
centralized 
assistance
Collaborations 
with Department 
of Agriculture 
and Food, 
Environmental 
Epidemiology, 
and LHD 
Sanitarians
Wisconsin Decentralized
854 Salmonella
221 STEC
18 Listeria
2009 Yes Yes 
Student 
Team
LHDs interview 
SSL cases with 
centralized 
assistance
EH staff directly 
supported
1SSL = Salmonella, STEC, and Listeria
2Data from Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Summary of Notifiable Diseases – 2010 (7)
3LHD = Local health department
4EHS-Net = Environmental Health Specialists Network
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Table 2.  Median and range for turn-around times for serotyping, PFGE subtyping, and attempting an interview, Y1.  
 TAT*
Salmonella STEC Listeria
Baseline Final Quarter Baseline Final Quarter Baseline Final Quarter
Serotype 6 (4–14) 4 (3–9) 5 (4–8) 4.5 (2–14) -- --
PFGE 6 (4–40) 5 (2–18) 4 (3–8) 4 (2–9) 4 (2–16) 4 (1–12)
Interview 1 (0–3) 0 (0–2) 2 (1–5) 1 (0–1) 7 (3–11) 1 (0–1)
*Turn-around time; median (range) in days
Figure 1.  Average and range of the proportion of Salmonella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC),  
and Listeria isolates with PFGE subtyping data available for baseline and the final quarter of Y1.
28
56
67
92
26
100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Baseline Final Quarter Baseline Final Quarter Baseline Final Quarter
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 is
ol
at
es
 (%
)
Mean
Salmonella Listeria STEC 
Figure 2.  Average and range of the proportion of Salmonella, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC),  
and Listeria cases with an attempted interview for baseline and the final quarter of Y1.
53
78
60
89
100100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Baseline Final Quarter Baseline Final Quarter Baseline Final Quarter
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 c
as
es
 (%
)
Mean
Salmonella Listeria STEC 
Page 10 of 11
Appendix A. FoodCORE Year One (Y1) Cumulative Metrics Data (Report Period: October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2011).
Performance Metrics:  
(See http://www.cdc.gov/foodcore/ssl-metrics.html for 
current language and definitions)
Salmonella Measures STEC Measures Listeria Measures
Mean (Range) Mean (Range) Mean (Range)
1a. Total number of isolates and isolate-yielding 
specimens 1181 (394–2066) 131 (15–284) 13 (5–28)
1b. Number of primary isolates/isolate-yielding 
specimens 1097 (366–1804) 112 (15–272) 12 (5–26)
2a. Total number of STEC clinical specimens or 
samples received at PHL 238 (73–693)
2b.  Number; Percent isolate-yielding  STEC 
specimens or samples 
No cumulative data 
available1
3. Median days from isolation /isolate-yielding 
specimen collection to receipt at PHL 7 days (5–10 days) 5 days (3–8) days 7 days (4–10 days)
4. Median days from receipt of isolate-yielding 
specimens at PHL to recovery of isolate 2 days (1–3 days) 3 days (1–5) days 3 days (1–4 days)
5. Percent of primary isolates with serotype 
information 99% (93–100%) 88% (66–100%)
6. Median days from isolate receipt (or recovery)  
at PHL to serotype result 6 days (3–8 days) 11 days (1–42) days
7. Percent of primary isolates with PFGE 
information 92% (52–100%) 98% (90–100%) 100% (100–100%)
8. Median days from isolate receipt (or recovery) 
at PHL to PFGE upload to PulseNet 7 days (2–20 days) 5 days (2–9) days 4 days (2–10 days)
9. Number of laboratory confirmed cases 
reported to epidemiology staff 1006 (285–1818) 117 (11–271) 13 (5–27)
10a. Percent of cases with attempted interview 93% (71–100%) 97% (89–100%) 97% (83–100%)
10b. Median days from case report to interview 
attempt 0.6 days (0–2 days) 1 days (0–2) days 1 days (0–2) days
10c. Percent of cases with complete demographic 
data 87% (71–100%) 87% (64–100%) 91% (80–100%)
10d. Percent of cases with exposure history 72% (36–89%) 77 % (64–86%) 84% (67–100%)
10d-i. Percent of SSL cases with full shotgun  
or case exposure completed
No cumulative data 
available1
No cumulative data 
available1
No cumulative data 
available1
10e. Percent of cases with serotype information 95% (88–100%) 73% (52–100%)
10f. Percent of cases with PFGE information 85% (42–100%) 87% (55–100%) 92% (80–100%)
10f-i. Percent of cases with PFGE with 
complete epi data 58% (34–82%) 66% (37–90%) 59% (0–79%)
10g. Reasons for not interviewing cases
i. Lost to Follow-up: Number; Percent 38 (4–85); 7% (2–15%) 2 (0–5); 6% (0–13%) 0.5 (0–1); 11% (0–33%)
ii. Refused: Number; Percent 16 (0–24); 8% (0–13%) 2 (0–6); 5% (0–16%) 0 (0–0); 0% (0–0%)
iii. Time lag too long: Number(Percent) No cumulative  data available1 5 (0–14); 9% (0–25%) 0.3 (0–1); 3% (0–11%)
iv. Other: Number; Percent 136 (117–172);  54% (7–86%)
11 (0–26);  
23% (0–68%) 1 (0–2); 44% (0–100%)
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Performance Metrics:  
(See http://www.cdc.gov/foodcore/ssl-metrics.html for 
current language and definitions)
Salmonella Measures STEC Measures Listeria Measures
Mean (Range) Mean (Range) Mean (Range)
11. Number of clusters 64 (16–99) 8 (0–30) 0.7 (0–2)
11a. Median and  range of cluster size(primary  
cases only)
No cumulative data 
available1
No cumulative data 
available1
No cumulative data 
available1
12. Number; Percent of clusters with cases in 
multiple states
35 (13–72);  
50% (15–73%)
3 (0–9);  
34% (0–100%) 1 (0–2); 67% (0–100%)
13a. Number; Percent of clusters with routine 
interview of cases
69 (34–98);  
96% (86–100%)
9 (2–30);  
100% (100–100%)
2 (1–2);  
100% (100–100%)
13b. Number; Percent of clusters with  
supplemental/targeted interviewing of cases
17 (3–45);  
27% (11–64%)
5 (0–12);  
48% (0–100%)
No cumulative data 
available1
13c. Number; Percent of clusters where an 
analytic epidemiologic study conducted (>10 
Salmonella or STEC cases, >5 Listeria cases)
9 (0–44); 33% (0–100%) 0.5 (0–2);  25% (0–100%) 0.7 (0–2); 33% (0–100%)
13d. Median duration ( in days) of epidemiologic 
investigation, from cluster notification to end of 
investigation/close-out
26 days (18–30) No cumulative data available1
No cumulative data 
available1
14. Number; Percent of clusters with suspect 
vehicle/source identified 11 (3–44); 16% (4–45%)
2 (0–5);  
36% (0–100%) 0.7 (0–2); 33% (0–100%)
15. Number; Percent of clusters with confirmed 
vehicle/source identified 4 (1–9); 6% (1–13%)
2 (0–5);  
27% (0–100%) 1 (0–2); 67% (0–100%)
16a. Number; Percent of clusters with identified 
vehicle/source with control measure 12 (0–44); 29% (0–63%)
3 (0–7);  
63% (0–100%)
No cumulative data 
available1
16b. Number; Percent of clusters with identified 
vehicle/source with public health action 9 (0–44); 22% (0–50%)
2 (1–4);  
54% (33–100%) 1 (0–2); 67% (0–100%)
17. Number; Percent of clusters linked to a 
restaurant/food establishment with EHA 2 (0–4); 15% (0–80%)
0.7 (0–3);  
20% (0–100%) 0 (0–0); 0% (0–0%)
18. Number; Percent of clusters with food/
environmental sample collected for testing  2 (0–7); 3% (0–9%) 2 (0–5); 9% (0–36%) 0 (0–0); 0% (0–0%)
19. Number; Percent of clusters where EH, 
Ag, regulatory, or food safety program staff 
contacted
23 (0–86);  
35% (0–100%)
11 (0–50);  
36% (0–100%) 1 (0–2); 67% (0–100%)
20. Number; Percent of outbreaks with NORS 
form completed 12 (1–48); 37% (3–94%)
4 (1–9);  
55% (24–100%)
No cumulative data 
available1
20a. Number; Percent of outbreaks with 
supplemental form completed
No cumulative data 
available1
No cumulative data 
available1
No cumulative data 
available1
1Cumulative data for this metric were not reported from 3 or more centers
